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I. INTRODUCTION

According to George Fletcher, “no idea testifies more powerfully to
individuals as a source of value than the principle of consent.” 1
Bolstered by a social contract ideology that prioritizes conceptions of
individual personhood, linear models of progress and regimes for the

* Professor of Socio-Legal Studies, School of Law, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom.
Email: vanessa.munro@nottingham.ac.uk. With the usual caveats, thanks are due to Sharon Cowan
for her comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to colleagues involved in the
original LSA Conference Panel on this topic for their invitation to join with them in contributing to
this symposium.
1. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 109 (1996).

923

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 5
MUNRO_FINAL

924

3/23/2009 3:23 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:923

protection of private property, the capacity to give consent has certainly
played a key role in the Anglo-American legal context, serving –
amongst other things – to accredit the human being with the status of
serious and rational agent, and to respect individuals as entities for
whom the distinction between self and other, and between mine and
thine, has profound significance. 2 In turn, the consent threshold has
often been used in contemporary liberal societies to demarcate the
terrain between acceptable and unacceptable intrusions upon property /
bodies, generating what Heidi Hurd has called its ‘moral magic’ in its
operation as a transformative channel between the harmful and the
harmless, and also thereby between the permissible, the condemnable
and the criminal. 3
At the same time, however, the presumptions that underpin this
conventional understanding of consent have come under increasing
scrutiny. Influenced by Marxist, feminist, and critical race analyses of
entrenched power disparity, as well as by Foucaultian insights into the
proliferation of normalizing techniques in modern society, theorists have
highlighted the constructed nature of choice, challenging thereby the
assumption of unconstrained freedom that animates the conventional
account. In addition, these theorists have drawn upon the work of
communitarian thinkers in order to deconstruct the myth of the detached
and abstract human agent by illustrating the inevitability of mutual interdependence and the profound influence of community and inter-personal
relationships in framing each person’s sense of self, and selfdetermination.
The implications of these debates over the role and legitimacy of
conventional accounts of consent have been felt across a number of
areas of legal, political, and moral theory. In this article, however,
attention will be focused exclusively on their relevance for our
understanding of, and responses to, sexual consent. More specifically,
2. John Gardner & Stephen Shute, The Wrongness of Rape, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE: FOURTH SERIES 193, 207 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). For further discussion on the
role and relevance of consent in the liberal context, see, for example, JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME I: HARM TO OTHERS (1984), JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME III: HARM TO SELF (1986), HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963), and JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., 1974).
3. Heidi Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (1996). This special
issue was dedicated to the issue of consent. See also Alan Wertheimer, Consent and Sexual
Relations, 2 LEGAL THEORY 89 (1996); Heidi M. Malm, The Ontological Status of Consent and Its
Implications for the Law of Rape, 2 LEGAL THEORY 147 (1996); Joan McGregor, Why When She
Says No She Doesn’t Mean Maybe and Doesn’t Mean Yes: A Critical Reconstruction of Consent,
Sex, and The Law, 2 LEGAL THEORY 175 (1996).
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this article will examine recent legislative efforts, in England and Wales,
to construct a criminal rape code that reflects a more context-sensitive
understanding of the consent threshold, and insists upon the
development of a more communicative terrain for socio-sexual
interaction. There is little doubt that the resulting Sexual Offences Act
2003 represents a well-intentioned intervention, and it can indeed be
seen to offer some significant improvements. 4 At the same time,
however, it will be argued that the legislative framework does (perhaps,
can do) little to recognize, let alone problematize, the complex ways in
which entrenched power disparities, material inequalities, relational
dynamics, and socio-sexual norms operate to construct and constrain not
only women’s ability to say ‘no’ to male sexual initiative, and to have
that refusal accredited both by society and law, but also – and perhaps
even more problematically – to say ‘yes,’ at least in the kind of free and
unfettered way that the liberal model of autonomy often seems to
presume.
In order to explore these issues within the confines of this article,
discussion will be broken down into three main parts. In the first
section, the nature and parameters of the conventional understanding of
consent will be examined in more detail and the contemporary
challenges that have been lodged against it – particularly from those
4. For an overview of the reform process, see Law Commission, Consent in Sexual Offences:
A Report to the Home Office Sex Offences Review, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/consent.pdf
(2000); United Kingdom Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual
Offences, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/vol1main.pdf?view=Binary (2000); United
Kingdom Home Office, Protecting the Public – Strengthening Protection Against Sex Offenders
and Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/protectingthe-public.pdf?view=Binary (2002); United Kingdom Home Office, Convicting Rapists and
Protecting Victims – Justice for Victims of Rape, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/cons290306-justice-rape-victims?view=Binary (Spring 2006) [hereinafter Home Office, Convicting
Rapists]; United Kingdom Home Office, Sexual Offences Act 2003: A Stocktake of the Effectiveness
of the Act Since its Implementation,
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/sexual/sexual24.pdf (2006). For general discussion
of the implications of the reforms, see Nicola Lacey, Beset by Boundaries: The Home Office Review
of Sexual Offences, 2001 CRIM. L. REV. 3; Philip Rumney, The Review of Sexual Offences and Rape
Law Reform: Another False Dawn?, 64 MOD. L. REV. 890 (2001); Jennifer Temkin & Andrew
Ashworth, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Rape, Sexual Assaults and the Problems of Consent, 2004
CRIM. L. REV. 328; Andrew Bainham & Belinda Brooks-Gordon, Reforming the Law on Sexual
Offences, in SEXUALITY REPOSITIONED 261 (Belinda Brooks-Gordon et al. eds., 2004); Vanessa
Munro, Dev’l-in Disguise? Harm, Privacy and the Sexual Offences Act 2003, in SEXUALITY AND
THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 1 (Vanessa Munro & Carl Franklin Stychin eds., 2007); Sharon
Cowan, Freedom and Capacity to Make a Choice: A Feminist Analysis of Consent in the Criminal
Law of Rape, in SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS 51 (Vanessa Munro & Carl
Franklin Stychin eds., 2007); FRANCIS BENNION, SEXUAL ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW: A CRITIQUE
OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES BILL 2003 (2003); and John Spencer, The Sexual Offences Act 2003:
Children and Family Offences, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 347.
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influenced by structural, post-structural, and communitarian analyses –
will be considered. With the terrain of these debates on consent – and
related concepts such as autonomy, agency, and self-determination – in
place, the second section of this article will focus specifically upon their
implications in the context of sexual consent in general, and women’s
sexual consent in particular. It will outline the development of the
Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales, and will discuss some
of the merits and demerits of the approach adopted towards rape as a
criminal offence therein. Having done so, discussion in the final part
will examine a number of the more fundamental difficulties posed by
this legislation’s instigation of a consent threshold that centers upon such
theoretically contested, and malleable, concepts as ‘freedom,’ ‘capacity,’
and ‘reasonableness.’ Juxtaposing the presumptions that often lie behind
these concepts in conventional liberal accounts with the messy and
multi-faceted realities of women’s daily lives, this section will examine
the adequacy of the legal response in terms of its ability to both reflect
and respond to the experiential patterns of (hetero)sexual initiative.
II. UNCOVERING THE ‘CON’ IN CONVENTIONAL THEORIES OF CONSENT
If, as social contract theorists have argued, our collective consent
(real or hypothesized) provided the mechanism through which the
institutional framework from which all modern law emanates was
established, 5 it follows that consent must in some ultimate sense be the
master of law. In reality, however, there are a number of difficulties
with such an analysis. For one thing, there are significant practical
barriers to revocation of consent in a world in which established
structures and processes – even flawed ones – are self-perpetuating, and
often preferable to a world of chaotic anarchism. In addition, the
assertion that consent is the master of law neglects or at least trivializes
the complex and powerful ways in which the dictates of law and
institutions of the state, once established, operate to construct the very
mechanisms of, and parameters for communicating, consent.
Indeed, as a number of critics have argued, this contractarian
perspective is premised on a dubious understanding of power as a
largely unilateral and one-dimensional force. 6 Law is presumed to be
5. While united by this contractarian perspective, it is clear that leading theorists in this
tradition also engage in some significant disagreements as to the detail of how, and to whom, this
allegiance is promised - see, for example, THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Crawford B. MacPherson
ed., 1968); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1963); and JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (George D.H. Cole ed., 1968).
6. For critique of the social contract tradition, and its treatment of women’s position in
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something issued by an identifiable sovereign, through a vehicle of
command or prohibition, to a collective who have authorized and
accepted their own subservient position. The upshot of this analysis is
not only a commitment to the legitimacy and neutrality of the imposition
of law’s force, but also an insistence that areas of social living that are
unregulated by such prohibitive commands are, therefore, areas in which
the human agent has a free and unfettered remit for individual selfdetermination. 7
While offering a more nuanced analysis of the origins of the state
and the basis for legitimate authority, it is often argued that these core
commitments continue to animate contemporary legal and political
thinking. 8
The links between this contractarian hypothesis and
liberalism are strong, traceable via chains of influence from Rousseau to
Kant, through the Enlightenment, and into a modern period in which
rationalism and individualism have been reified as prerequisites for, and
paradigm manifestations of, effective citizenship. 9 Subjectivity is
expressed here primarily through the exercise of agency, and consent

particular, see, for example, CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); and Carole
Pateman & Teresa Brennan, Mere Auxilliaries to the Commonwealth – Women and the Origins of
Liberalism, 27 POLITICAL STUDIES 183 (1979). This challenge to the one-way projection of
authority underpinning the contract model has been re-iterated, moreover, in the context of other
approaches, e.g. Austin’s command model of law – see, for example, HERBERT LIONEL ADOLPHUS
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) and (from a quite different perspective) ALAN HUNT &
GARY WICKHAM, FOUCAULT AND LAW: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AS GOVERNANCE (1994).
This failure to recognize the ‘force’ of law’s imposition has also been challenged, for example, in
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundations of Authority’, in DECONSTRUCTION AND
THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
7. For critique of this public/private distinction, see, for example, Ruth Gavison, Feminism
and the Public / Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) and Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847 (2000).
8. For extended discussion of the links between the historical and contemporary uses of the
concept of consent, see, for example, Maria Drakopoulou, Feminism and Consent: A Genealogical
Inquiry, in CHOICE AND CONSENT: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW AND SUBJECTIVITY (Sharon
Cowan & Rosemary Hunter eds., 2008).
9. See Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT – IMMANUEL
KANT’S MORAL AND POLITICAL WRITINGS 132 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1949); IMMANUEL KANT,
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY, AND MORALS (Ted Humphrey
trans., 1983); IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1964);
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1965); IMMANUEL
KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT (Werner Pluhar trans., 1987). Indeed, Kant explicitly
expressed his indebtedness to Rousseau, especially for his belief in the common man, and for
having “first discovered universal human nature beneath the multiplicity of adopted human forms,
and the hidden law . . . .” CARL FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT: IMMANUEL KANT’S MORAL
AND POLITICAL WRITINGS xxiii (1949). See also BARRY HINDESS, DISCOURSES OF POWER: FROM
HOBBES TO FOUCAULT (2001); Patrick Riley, On Kant as the Most Adequate Social Contract
Theorist, 1 POL. THEORY 450 (1973).
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continues to be the presumed (yet rarely interrogated) mode of its
communication. 10 Accrediting the articulation or refusal of consent with
core significance, this liberal model – like its contractarian predecessor –
often presumes a particular conception of the subject and an abstract,
rational and self-serving framework for the operation of agency.
Granted, as Martha Nussbaum has repeatedly pointed out, “‘liberalism’
is not a single position but a family of positions,” 11 and there is a danger
in assuming too much unity amongst disparate liberal thinkers. That
said, however, critics have identified a tendency in certain strands of
liberal theory to analyze social problems by removing actors from their
everyday environment, stripping them of the characteristics and
relationships that influence their choices, and placing them in a sterile
legal world where complex dilemmas are resolved by detached models
of distributive justice and invocation of self-interested and conflictoriented claims. 12 This can be seen, they insist, in the work of John
Rawls, who invokes the veil of ignorance to remove from social agents
all knowledge of their class, talents, aspirations, relationships, etc. as a
necessary precursor to unencumbered (and, by implication, ‘purer’)
reasoning about social justice; 13 or alternatively, in the work of Ronald
Dworkin, who imposes a framework premised on equal concern and
respect, which operates on a presumption that other-regarding desires or
preferences (and the underlying attachments they represent) be

10. For further discussion, and critique of this assumption, see, for example, KATHY
FERGUSON, THE MAN QUESTION: VISIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY IN FEMINIST THEORY (1993); KAREN
GREEN, THE WOMAN OF REASON: FEMINISM, HUMANISM AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (1995);
GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: ‘MALE’ AND ‘FEMALE’ IN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY
(1993); EVA FEDE KITTAY, WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1987); and
FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF IMMANUEL KANT (Robin May Schott ed., 1997).
11. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57 (1999).
12. Linda McClain, Atomistic Man Revisited: Liberalism, Connection and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1177 (1992).
13. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 516 (1972). See also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 453 (2000). For further discussion of this aspect of Rawls’ work and its implications for
women’s lives, see SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND
POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS (1992); SUSAN OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY (1989); Susan Okin, John Rawls: Justice as Fairness – For Whom?, in FEMINIST
INTERPRETATIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 181 (Mary Shanley and Carole Pateman eds., 1994);
Susan Okin, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2004); Martha
Nussbaum, Rawls and Feminism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS (Samuel Richard
Freeman ed., 2003); Annette Baier, The Need for More than Justice, in JUSTICE AND CARE:
ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 47 (Virginia Held ed., 1995); ALISON M. JAGGAR,
FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS
OF DIFFERENCE (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988);
and ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997).
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disregarded as distortive and ‘vulgar’ influences on the acceptable face
of utilitarianism. 14
Critics have argued that such abstract and individualist approaches
are fundamentally counter-intuitive at the level of human experience,
and have sought to illustrate the role that the rhetoric of liberalism (in
particular, its characteristic claims to neutrality, objectivity, and
universality) has played in both disguising the complex realities of
consent and obscuring the extent to which human agency is curtailed to
comply with this artificial framework. Seeking to contextualize
concepts of agency, subjectivity, and autonomy in the concrete realm of
social interaction and contemporary power relations, these critics have,
in their different ways, called for a re-evaluation of the prevailing notion
of consent and a replacement of its image of unfettered self-determinism
with a more realistic account of the constructed operation of choice in
specific human situations.
A. The Structural Challenge
Those claiming to speak on behalf of marginalized and oppressed
social groups have lodged a radical challenge to the dualistic vision of
consensually imposed ‘public’ authority and an unregulated ‘private’
sphere of freedom. Whether premised on axes of class, gender, or race,
it has been argued that the freedom of some individuals (members of
privileged / dominant groups) is secured in contemporary society at the
expense of the freedom of others. Mirroring the contractarian vision of
power as a commodity held in the hands of some whilst being
systematically denied from the ownership of others, these critics
emphasize that the basis on which this dynamic is established lacks
legitimacy. The social fault lines created by this are, in turn, deeply
(albeit often subtly) entrenched - distribution of material wealth, as well
as of social opportunity and personal expectation, maps onto these
power structures, embedding the marginalized group in a position of
weakness and dependency, and satiating its members’ needs just enough

14. Ronald Dworkin, Do We Have a Right to Pornography?, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 36061 (1985). For discussion and critique of this position, see, for example, Herbert Lionel Adolphus
Hart, Between Utility and Rights, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 198 (1983).
Despite its relevance to the critique of liberalism, there has been relatively little direct feminist
engagement with Dworkin on this matter – notable exceptions to this, however, are Nicola Lacey,
Closure and Critique in Feminist Jurisprudence: Transcending the Dichotomy or a Foot in Both
Camps?, in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY 167
(1998); VALERIE KERRUISH, JURISPRUDENCE AS IDEOLOGY (1991); and DRUCILLA CORNELL, AT
THE HEART OF FREEDOM: FEMINISM, SEX AND EQUALITY (1998).
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to imbue this hierarchy with a gloss of egalitarianism that manages
(without redressing) discontent. 15
In a context in which this dynamic of oppressor / oppressed marks
the social and legal landscape, theorists from Karl Marx to Catharine
MacKinnon and beyond have questioned liberalism’s uncritical faith in
the ideal of consent and in the rational and autonomous chooser that is
presumed to populate its operation. The scope for self-determination
afforded to the disempowered is radically reduced, not just by formal
prohibitions that deny the availability of certain choices, but also by
informal mechanisms that render certain choices too costly – financially,
socially, or personally – to be realistic options. Lack of flexible working
practices, or of affordable childcare, for example – when coupled with a
sex-specific capacity for reproduction and a strong social mandate for
women to act as primary child-carers – undermine the pursuit of gender
equality in the workplace. In the formal liberal model, however, it is the
creation of the opportunity that matters, even when absent the broader
social and cultural shifts required to render its selection viable.
Consequently, under current conditions, women’s lower uptake is
construed as indicative of their lack of interest in this choice, rather than
as a potential symptom of their disempowerment and their inability to
take what they want. 16
Conversely, moreover, this critique emphasizes the artificiality of
the conventional model not only in those contexts in which
15. As Catharine MacKinnon puts it, in regard to gender relations, “[t]he liberal state
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender –
through its legitimating norms [including neutrality], forms, relations to society, and substantive
policies.” CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 162 (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY]. See also Catharine MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, & The State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 3, 515 (1982); Catharine
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, & The State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS
4, 635 (1983); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
(1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; and – for more recent discussion – see,
CATHARINE MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS (2005) and CATHARINE MACKINNON,
ARE WOMEN HUMAN? AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUES (2006).
16. Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, in AMERICAN FEMINIST
THOUGHT AT CENTURY’S END: A READER 382-83 (Linda Kauffman ed., 1993); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY (2001). For further discussion of the limits of this approach, see also,
for example, Patricia Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 837 (1990);
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA (1984);
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE
REFORM (1991); and SYLVIA WALBY, GENDER TRANSFORMATIONS (1997). For extended analysis
of the deployment of ‘choice’ in contemporary neo-liberal privatization of care-taking
responsibilities, see also Gillian Calder, The Personal is Economic: Unearthing the Rhetoric of
Choice in the Canadian Maternity and Parental Leave Benefit Debates, in CHOICE AND CONSENT,
supra note 8.
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disempowered persons / groups say no to a choice that is open to them
only in theory, but also in situations in which they say yes to certain
options. In a world in which survival on the best possible terms requires
aligning oneself as closely as possible to those who have power, it is
argued that we should treat with suspicion those ‘choices’ that comply
with the demands of the dominant or that work to maintain the current
power relations. Just as workers ‘consent’ to all kinds of exploitative
employment practices out of necessity, so too it is argued that women
‘consent’ to heterosexual relationships and procreation in order to
benefit from male protection. 17 In both cases, however, the reality is one
of ‘submit to survive’ rather than a reflection of genuine autonomy. The
alternatives are too unpleasant, too draining, or too dangerous to be
meaningful, and compliance with the hegemony emerges as the
inevitable conclusion.
B. The Post-Structural Challenge
The work of Michel Foucault has been central to the development
of the post-structural challenge. 18 In positing modern power as a
pervasive force that infiltrates all aspects of social living through the
invocation of normative expectations and discursive discipline,
Foucault’s work not only highlights the artificiality of the notion of
unregulated social space, but challenges the attendant contention that
individuals have a free and unfettered remit for self-determination within
these confines. Emphasizing the extent to which power is a normalizing,
rather than primarily repressive, force, Foucault insists that control of the
individual in modern society is ensured, not through direct state
repression but through strategies of discipline that ensure self-regulation
towards prioritized norms. 19 As a result, while Foucault continues to

17. See, for example, SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE
267-68 (1975); Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and Rape: The State as a Male Protection Racket, in
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY 368-69 (Mary Vetterling-Braggin et al. eds., 1977); and Adrienne
Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, 5 SIGNS 631, 636-67 (1980).
18. See, in particular, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH – THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., 1979); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER / KNOWLEDGE – SELECTED INTERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-77 (Colin Gordon trans., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, POWER /
KNOWLEDGE]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1980) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, VOLUME I]; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME II: THE USE OF PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1985); and
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY VOLUME III: THE CARE OF THE SELF (Robert
Hurley trans., 1986).
19. FOUCAULT, POWER / KNOWLEDGE, supra note 18, at 73-74.
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take the individual as his point of theoretical departure, he rejects any
metaphysical assumption that the world is populated by autonomous,
self-legislating moral subjects. On the contrary, he argues that the
human subject is produced by, and reflective of, the norms and power
dynamics of social life: subjected rather than transcendent, and a
constructed identity rather than organic entity. 20
One of the distinguishing features of the modern, disciplinary
society, according to Foucault, is the extent to which power “circulate[s]
through progressively finer channels.” 21 It operates at the ‘capillaries’
of existence, “seep[ing] into the very grain of individuals, reach[ing]
right into their bodies, permeat[ing] their gestures, their postures, what
they say, how they learn to live and work with other people.” 22 This
makes the disciplinary dictates of such power relations not only
pervasive but also extremely effective, bolstering the illusion of freedom
whilst restricting the remit for choice. While this is not to dismiss the
possibility of resistance - indeed, according to Foucault, wherever there
is a power relation, there is also, by definition, scope for resistance - it is
to challenge the ideal of transcendent freedom and the notion of
unfettered self-determination that critics argue form a central pillar of
the liberal account. The individual may exercise creativity in the way in
which her existence is fashioned, but the practices through which this is
achieved are always, if not determined by, then at least framed in
relation to, the socio-cultural context. These ‘practices of the self’ are
“not something that the individual invents . . . [but] patterns that he finds
in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed upon him
by his culture, his society and his social group.” 23

20. Id. In Foucault’s own words, “the individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on
by the exercise of power. The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of a
relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.” Id.
21. Sandra Bartky, Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power, in
FEMINISM AND FOUCAULT: REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE 79 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds.,
1988).
22. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE WILL TO TRUTH 216 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1980).
23. Michel Foucault, The Ethics of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in THE FINAL
FOUCAULT 11 (James Bernauer & David Rasmussen eds., 1988). The implications of much of this
analysis of power, resistance and subversion are developed further in the context of gender relations
by Judith Butler – see, in particular, JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE – FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER – ON THE DISCURSIVE
LIMITS OF ‘SEX’ (1993); and JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER (2004). However, this direction of
feminist analysis has also attracted considerable criticism – see, for example, FEMINISM AND
FOUCAULT, supra note 21; NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES – POWER, DISCOURSE AND
GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY (1989); FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT (Susan Hekman ed., 1996); LOIS MCNAY, FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM: POWER, GENDER
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As with the structural challenge, then, this post-structural analysis
emphasizes the extent to which the scope for, and expression of, consent
is both constructed and curtailed by broader social imperatives. But
where the structural critic has focused upon macro-level forces and
systematic power disparities (mapping variously onto class, gender, or
race divisions), the post-structural critic has argued for a more fluid
conception of power, leading in turn to a concern with the selfregulatory influence of disciplinary norms. 24 By constructing the
subject who ‘chooses’ conformity within the confines of the socially
prescribed, it is argued that such discipline undermines the very
legitimacy of that choice.
C. The Communitarian Challenge
To the extent that one’s community and relational context provide
vital components of the infrastructure through which disciplinary
discourses circulate, as well as offering localized vectors for the
expression of broader axes of group-based oppression, the
communitarian challenge to liberalism in general, and to its conceptions
of subjectivity and agency in particular, can be seen as allied in
important ways to both the structural and the post-structural critique. At
the same time, however, the origins of communitarianism remain
distinctive and the contours of its utopian vision are markedly different –
in both form and content – from those that animate structural claims to
revolution or post-structural calls for resistance. As such, it merits
independent treatment.
At the heart of the communitarian challenge is an insistence that the
starting point for analysis – in legal, political, and moral theory – should
be the social rather than the individual. From the outset, this approach
turns the tables on certain key strands of liberal thinking by showing that
“the autonomous individual agent is itself a product of social
construction,” which is embedded in a particular context. 25 In so doing,
it maintains that “if liberalism is true as a social theory, this is only
AND THE SELF

(1992); and CAROLINE RAMAZANOGLU, UP AGAINST FOUCAULT: EXPLORATIONS OF
SOME TENSIONS BETWEEN FOUCAULT AND FEMINISM (1993).
24. See Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32 (Paul
Rabinow ed., 1984). For further discussion of the similarities and tensions between these
approaches, see, for example, Vanessa Munro, On Power and Domination: Feminism and the Final
Foucault, 2 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 79 (2003); Alan Hunt, Getting Marx and Foucault Into Bed
Together!, 31 J. L. & SOC’Y 592 (2004); and AMY ALLEN, THE POWER OF FEMINIST THEORY:
DOMINATION, RESISTANCE, SOLIDARITY (1999).
25. ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE 57 (1983).
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because it is, in a wider sense, false.” 26 It is argued that this
conventional preoccupation with the individual is not only misguided
but also impoverished. By excluding from consideration issues of
personal affection and phenomenological experience, communitarian
theorists argue that the liberal tradition has perpetuated a highly abstract
conception of agency and a largely hollow account of what it is to be a
self-aware and socially immersed being. Humans are inherently interdependent, necessarily situated in, and at least partially constituted by,
the communities in which they live, the traditions in which they are
raised, and the associations they form with others. 27 What’s more, these
are not conditions that can – or should – be transcended in the pursuit of
abstract individualism, since to do so would distort the realities of
human existence and deny the value and meaning attributable to its
relational dimensions. 28
Communitarian critics insist, then, that liberalism maintains its
rhetoric of unconstrained self-determination (reflected in and
represented by prevailing consent thresholds) only by abstracting the
individual from the social dynamics and relational commitments that
inform the very exercise of human agency. In so doing, however, they
point out that it not only offers a vision of social interaction that is
fundamentally unrealistic, unachievable, and undesirable, but disguises
the extent to which such communitarian imperatives pose their own
dangers (of undue conservatism or subservience to the demands of
others, for example), which must be both acknowledged and opened up
to critical scrutiny. 29
D. Towards a Critical Consensus on Consent?
Despite the considerable differences in priority and emphasis within
these accounts, then, there is consensus that consent as a moral and legal

26. Id.
27. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1999);
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); and ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY (1990).
28. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 152-53 (1982);
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF – THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (1989); and,
generally, THE COMMUNITARIAN CHALLENGE TO LIBERALISM (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller
& Jeffrey Paul eds., 1996).
29. For discussion of these concerns, with particular reference to their implications for
women, see, amongst others - Nicola Lacey, Community in Legal Theory: Idea, Ideal or Ideology?,
in UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS, supra note 14, at 125; Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern
Friendship – Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHICS 275 (1989); SUSAN J. HEKMAN, MORAL
VOICES, MORAL SELVES (1995); and FRAZER & LACEY, supra note 25.
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notion may only support the normative significance attributed to it in
much liberal theory on the basis of a suspect understanding of the
relationship between the individual and society. Such a theory, it is
argued, presents its subject as highly atomistic, depicting society as a
voluntary and equal association of self-sufficient individuals, each
capable of making free decisions about how best to live their lives. 30
Although – at the level of theory and intuition – there may be a
number of difficulties with this account, in the legal arena, where a
reminiscent pull towards the abstract has often been identified, it has
nonetheless proven to be particularly resilient. In contexts ranging from
contract to medical law, standards for the issuing of consent have been
created in which – for the most part – there is an emphasis on principles
of caveat emptor and informed decision-making, even in situations in
which there are profound disparities of power between the parties or a
dearth of alternatives for consideration. In the regulation of sexuality,
moreover, where a delicate balance is called for between permitting
expression and prohibiting violation, the standard legal form has been
similarly formulaic and disconnected from the terrain of contemporary
socio-sexual interaction. In the next section, the criticisms lodged at this
approach will be considered and recent legislative efforts in England and
Wales – which were designed, in part, to provide an affirmative and
context-sensitive standard for consent – will be examined.
III. SEXUAL CONSENT AND THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003
Feminist engagement on consent, and on women’s sexual consent
in particular, is clearly mirrored in and influenced by the criticisms of
the conventional conception of agency discussed above. Susan Estrich’s
distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘real’ rape, 31 for example, has been
repeatedly deployed to challenge the ways in which social imperatives
(or disciplinary techniques) construct norms of gendered sexual behavior
against which women are judged, both by society and by law. 32 The
30. For further critique, see, for example, Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the
Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 13 (1999); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS (2003); Sabina
Lovibond, Meaning What We Say – Feminist Ethics and The Critique of Humanism, 215-20 NEW
LEFT REVIEW 98 (1996); and RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY,
AGENCY AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
31. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 10 (1987).
32. See, for example, in the UK context, ZSUZSANNA ADLER, RAPE ON TRIAL (1987); SEX
CRIMES ON TRIAL: THE USE OF SEXUAL EVIDENCE IN SCOTTISH COURTS (Beverley Brown, Michele
Burman & Lynn Jamieson eds., 1993); JENNIFER TEMKIN, RAPE AND THE LEGAL PROCESS (2d ed.
2002); and SUE LEES, CARNAL KNOWLEDGE – RAPE ON TRIAL (1996).
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female body, it is argued, has been analyzed, “qualified and
disqualified—as being thoroughly saturated with sexuality,” 33 with
medical and psychological discourses justifying the prohibition of
various social and sexual activities from women on the basis of claims to
an inherently dangerous female sexuality, which is seen to be in
perpetual need of (beneficent) control. Women who exhibit nonconforming behavior in this context – by drinking alcohol, dressing
provocatively, or initiating intimacy – are deemed to have sent out
signals of sexual interest which cannot be easily revoked when
subsequently relied upon by an observer. At the same time, male
sexuality is depicted as uncontrollably natural, consisting of
overwhelming urges and desires, which leaves the male sexual
imperative and its utilization of coercive strategies of sexual persuasion
(a.k.a. courtship) unchecked. 34
Concerned by the (in)ability of the consent threshold to secure
justice in a context in which sexual stereotyping is prevalent and
powerful, this critique highlights the contributory role of a courtroom
culture in which adversarial methods and dichotomous outcomes prevail,
with the result that the defendant’s acquittal is equated with his
innocence and with sexual complicity and deceit on the complainant’s
part. Although non-consent is a required element in many crimes, these
critics point out that in rape trials this threshold is operationalized in a
context of profound suspicion of female sexuality. As Nagire Naffine
puts it:
[R]ape is a crime whose setting is a society where women are expected
to repress their desires, where they are expected to want what a man
wants, where women’s sexual wishes are actively (though never
completely) suppressed or rendered mysterious or incredible whenever
they cease to fit the possessive form. 35

One of the upshots of this is an insistence that women who are
treated as passive and powerless in other matters are nonetheless
33. FOUCAULT, VOLUME I, supra note 18, at 104. See also ROSALYN DIPROSE, THE BODIES
WOMEN: ETHICS, EMBODIMENT AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (1994); KATHY DAVIS, EMBODIED
PRACTICES: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY 3 (1997).
34. Evidence of these attitudes can be found in a range of studies – for example, see Amnesty
International,
Sexual
Assault
Research
Summary
Report,
Nov.
21,
2005,
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=16618; and for general discussion of
psychological research on attitudes to rape, see, for example, COLLEEN A. WARD, ATTITUDES
TOWARDS RAPE: FEMINIST AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (1995); and NICOLA
GAVEY, JUST SEX?: THE CULTURAL SCAFFOLDING OF RAPE (2005).
35. Ngaire Naffine, Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape, 57 MOD. L. REV. 10, 34-35
(1994).
OF
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required to be strong, aggressive, and powerful in rejecting intimacy. 36
Standards used in rape laws typically direct attention to the
complainant’s, rather than (or at least as much as) the defendant’s,
behavior, and normative expectations regarding the proper feminine role
influence decision-making at all stages of the legal system: women, who
are conditioned to attribute sexual violation to the (im)propriety of their
own conduct, do not recognize the offense or are reluctant to report it; 37
police and prosecutors evaluate the strength of cases on the basis of
women’s conformance to socio-sexual norms, with attrition rates
demonstrating the extent to which cases involving drunken or
provocatively dressed complainants, complainants who have made
previous allegations, who do not exhibit signs of physical injury, or who
have an active sexual history, are not taken forward; 38 and in turn courts
(and, in particular, juries) re-affirm these stereotypes - witnessing only a
tiny proportion of the most conformant cases but nonetheless rigorously
policing the boundaries of the acceptable, and rarely convicting in a case
where the complainant’s conduct falls foul of these standards. 39
36. In many jurisdictions, this has been reflected in a legal requirement that the complainant’s
will be overborne in the course of the rape, manifesting itself in physical injury as the woman
‘resists to the utmost’ against her attacker. While, this force requirement has long been formally
abandoned under English law, it remained a core feature of Scots law until the recent decision of the
Court of Session in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001), 2002 S.L.T. 466 (H.C.J.).
37. See, e.g., Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. OF
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 169 (1987); Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual
Aggression and Victimisation in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT II 4-5 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988); Mary P. Koss, The Underdetection of
Rape: Methodological Choices Influence Incidence Estimates, 48 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 61, 65-66
(1992); Mary P. Koss, Detecting the Scope of Rape: A Review of Prevalence Research Methods, 8 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 198, 205 (1993). But cf. KATIE ROPHIE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX,
FEAR AND FEMINISM (1993). See also Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103
PUB. INT. 54 (1991).
38. See LIZ KELLY ET AL., UNITED KINGDOM HOME OFFICE, A GAP OR A CHASM? ATTRITION
IN REPORTED RAPE CASES 46 (2005), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/hors293.pdf.
Further review of attrition in rape cases has been conducted via the recent Joint Inspection Report of
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. See HER MAJESTY’S CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE
INSPECTORATE, WITHOUT CONSENT: A REPORT ON THE JOINT REVIEW OF INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECUTION
OF
RAPE
OFFENCES
(2007),
http://www.hmcpsi.gov.uk/reports/Without_Consent_Thematic.pdf.
39. There is considerable social psychology literature which evidences these attitudes
amongst jurors – for a thorough overview, see Douglas D. Koski, Jury Decisionmaking in Rape
Trials: A Review & Empirical Assessment, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 21–159 (2002) or GARY D. LAFREE,
RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT (1989). For more
recent evidence of these attitudes in the UK context, see Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, The
Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution
in Rape Trials Involving Intoxicants, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Finch &
Munro, Demon Drink]; Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in
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In this context, it has been argued that the deference afforded to the
conventional conception of consent in rape laws disguises the extent to
which men and women do not operate in, choose from, or communicate
on the basis of an equal and mutually respectful terrain. On the contrary,
social stereotypes and anachronistic assumptions about appropriate
gendered behavior inform our subjectivities (as gendered and sexual
beings), activities, choices, and assessments of scope for refusal. Men
are pressured into the role of sexual hunter and women are encouraged
to perform the role of sexual prey, which hardly represents the climate of
mutual equality, dignity, or freedom presumed by the liberal model.
Building on her critique of the social contract tradition, Carole Pateman
has emphasized the “failure in liberal-democratic theory and practice to
distinguish free commitment and agreement by equals from domination,
subordination, and inequality.” 40 And in the specific context of sexual
relations, Catharine MacKinnon has lodged a similar challenge, insisting
that the idea of consent, while fundamental to contemporary
understandings of, and responses to rape, is inadequate, primarily
because it ignores the reality that men and women do not engage in
sexual negotiations on an equal footing. 41
In a patriarchal world in which, according to MacKinnon, women
exist as oppressed victims of male power, tokens of heterosexual
interest, acquiescence, or even initiative, may be as much a mechanism
for survival as an expression of legitimate choice. 42 With characteristic
boldness, she suggests that “rape law takes women’s usual response to
coercion – acquiescence, the despairing response to hopelessness to
unequal odds – and calls that consent” 43 and insists that, in a context in
which the law licenses men to act as sexual predators, using whatever
level of force or seduction the patriarchal society deems acceptable, rape
becomes hard to distinguish from ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse. 44

Rape Cases Involving Intoxicants, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005) [hereinafter Finch & Munro,
Juror Stereotypes]. There is, however, some literature which indicates that non-conforming women
may be able to elicit juror sympathy where they demonstrate resistant strategies in the courtroom –
see Wendy Larcombe, The ‘Ideal’ Victim v Successful Rape Complainants: Not What You Might
Expect, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 131 (2002).
40. Carole Pateman, Women and Consent, in THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY,
FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 83 (1989).
41. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 15, at 100.
42. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 168
43. Id.
44. As MacKinnon expresses it - “[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to
articulate because the unquestionable starting point has been that rape is definable as distinct from
intercourse, when for women it is difficult to distinguish them under conditions of male
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There is no doubt that these arguments present a rhetorically and
politically powerful critique, but commentators have expressed
increasing concern about the relationship between these assertions and a
contemporary feminist project that seeks to transcend essentialist claims
or deterministic prophecies of male/female relations. 45 While instances
of rape and ‘normal’ heterosexual intercourse may exist, under
patriarchy at least, on a continuum, such commentators point out that it
is difficult to see how equating them can do anything other than belittle
the experiences both of the rape victim (by making her violation
‘ordinary’) and of the woman who conceives herself as a voluntary
sexual agent (by making her intimate connection a violation). Indeed, as
Stephen Schulhofer puts it, “[w]e cannot simply dismiss as ‘false
consciousness’ the perceptions of women themselves. And for many
women, sweeping attacks on the possibility of uncoerced sex . . . are
greatly overdrawn.” 46 Thus, while MacKinnon’s claims are perhaps to
be commended for drawing attention to the constraints and cultural
pressures that operate upon women’s ability to make sexual choices, her
failure to discriminate between the different kinds of pressure and her
refusal to engage with the role that (some) women play in perpetuating –
or, indeed, resisting – these pressures is theoretically limiting and
strategically damaging.
What’s more, it might be argued that it generates premature and / or
only superficially compelling calls for the abandonment of the consent
threshold itself. A number of commentators have argued for a
reformulation of rape, proposing either to relegate non-consent from
being a constitutive element of the offence (limiting its presence to
defensive relevance) or to establish a differentiated ‘familial’ system in
which a substantive definitional content describes the harm in its
absence (e.g. rape by coercion, drug assisted rape, rape by force, etc.). 47
dominance.” Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 647 (1983).
45. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Nature of Domination and The Nature of Women:
Reflections on Feminism Unmodified, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 352 (1988); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly
Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1990); Angela Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Kathryn Abrams,
Ideology and Women’s Choices, 24 GA. L. REV. 761 (1990); Drucilla Cornell, Sexual Difference,
The Feminine and Equivalency: A Critique of MacKinnon’s Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,
100 YALE L.J. 2247 (1991); Emily Jackson, Catharine MacKinnon and Feminist Jurisprudence: A
Critical Appraisal, 19 J. L. & SOC’Y 195 (1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1181 (1994); CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989).
46. STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF LAW 56 (1998) (citations omitted).
47. Victor Tadros, Rape Without Consent, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 515, 518 (2006).
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Such approaches may, however, be problematic. For one thing, as John
Gardner and Stephen Shute have argued, in the context of rape, some
concept of consent is needed to allow people to act, and be respected, as
moral agents who police the boundaries of their personal intimacy by
inviting as well as denying sexual access. 48 Of course, one might
respond to this claim – as Victor Tadros has done – by insisting that
“[e]ven if the concept of consent is central to the most appropriate
theoretical investigation into the scope of the law of rape,” its excessive
and inherent ambiguity means that it is simply not useful in the
delineation of the law itself. 49 But this response begs crucial questions
about the wisdom of concerning oneself “only with practical law
reform” 50 in a context in which the reforms in question generate
conceptual frameworks that are consciously detached from – and
arguably at odds with – the wrong, and wrongdoing, that occasions their
instigation and development. In addition, it is far from clear that these
proposed reforms would, in practice, do a great deal to avoid the
reinsertion of the consent threshold in the courtroom. Regina Graycar
and Jenny Morgan have argued that reforms rendering consent a defense
have not prevented disputes about its presence from arising, and have
done little to prevent dubious claims about appropriate female sociosexual behavior from continuing to inform both judicial and jury
reasoning. 51 Likewise, Jennifer Temkin, having conducted a review of
the impact of rape reforms in New South Wales, Michigan, and Canada,
has concluded that “the problem of consent is unlikely to vanish
whatever means are adopted to deal with it.” 52
It is profoundly disappointing to find that the concept of consent
has been distorted out of recognition, and too often out of utility, in the
context of rape law: a context in which one would hope – given the
importance of what is at stake – that it would be at its most stringent.
But for all the legitimate concerns expressed in regard to its operation
here, its potential for more productive deployment in a world beyond
patriarchy should not be ignored. Indeed, as Sharon Cowan has
emphasized, “[c]onsent is a concept which we can fill with either narrow
liberal values, based on the idea of the subject as an individual atomistic
rational choice maker, or with feminist values encompassing attention to
48. Gardner & Shute, supra note 2, at 193, 207-08.
49. Tadros, supra note 47, at 518.
50. Id. at 519.
51. REGINA GRAYCAR & JENNY MORGAN, THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 365-66 (Federation
Press 2d ed. 2002). Discussed in Cowan, supra note 4, at 68.
52. TEMKIN, supra note 32, at 176.
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mutuality, embodiment, relational choice, and communication.” 53 The
solution, then, is not to abandon consent as the transformative channel
between the permissible and the condemnable, but to reformulate it in a
way that enables it to take greater account of the peculiarities of context,
constraint, and construction, and to operate with renewed vigor in the
pursuit of social justice. 54 Amongst other things, this approach boasts
the strategic advantage of preserving a dialogue with liberalism and law
– on terms that are familiar to it – without denying the complexity of the
relationship between a woman, the ‘choices’ that she makes, and the
motivations that drive those choices. In so doing, it enables moral and
legal theory to recognize that consent does have meaning for (some)
women, many of whom experience their heterosexual relationships as an
expression of agency, without thereby endorsing or entailing the claim
that “women are immune from various pressures to constrain and
regulate these relationships, or that such constraints operate to the
prejudice of women and to the benefit of men, or that the existence of
such constraints cannot be explained in terms of a disparity of power
between men and women.” 55
To the extent that the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and
Wales seeks to preserve the role of non-consent as the triggering
condition for criminality in rape cases, while simultaneously providing a
more developed understanding of what consent requires in this context,
it might be argued that this legislation represents a significant step
forward. The following section outlines the legislative framework in
more detail and evaluates its potential to better respect women’s sexual
autonomy and to protect rape complainants.
A. Re-Setting the Boundaries?: The Sexual Offences Act 2003
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is a wide-ranging piece of
legislation, intended to consolidate and modernize the law in England
53. Cowan, supra note 4, at 53.
54. Reconstruction, along similar lines, of other (often complementary) concepts in liberal
legal / political theory have recently been defended in feminist / critical scholarship – see, for
example, CORNELL, supra note 14; ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003); DAVINA
COOPER, CHALLENGING DIVERSITY: RETHINKING EQUALITY AND THE VALUE OF DIFFERENCE
(2004); SIOBHAN MULLALLY, GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: RECLAIMING
UNIVERSALISM (2006); REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF
TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di
Stefano eds., 1996); and VANESSA MUNRO, LAW AND POLITICS AT THE PERIMETER: REEVALUATING KEY DEBATES IN FEMINIST THEORY (2007).
55. DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 97 (1998).
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and Wales on various aspects of socio-sexual life. Section 1(1) defines
rape as the non-consensual penile penetration (vaginal, anal, or oral) of
another person in circumstances in which the defendant does not
reasonably believe in consent. 56 Section 1(2) goes on to state that the
reasonableness of this belief will be determined in light of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the steps that the defendant took to
ascertain whether the complainant was consenting. 57 Thus, while the
legislation preserves the traditional focus on consent and belief in
consent as the threshold for criminality, this offense definition – in
particular its extension to oral penetration and its shift from the
defendant’s honest 58 to reasonable belief – marks a significant change.
In addition, where the concept of consent was previously undefined,
with the jury left to determine its presence by “applying their combined
good sense, experience and knowledge of human nature and modern
behaviour” to the facts of each case, 59 clear efforts have now been made
to move beyond this non-prescriptive stance.
More specifically, the Act imposes a structure for guiding decisionmaking on the presence or absence of sexual consent. It does so in a
number of ways. First, it provides a definition of consent under section
74: “a person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and
capacity to make that choice.” 60 Secondly, it provides, under section 75,
an exhaustive list of circumstances (including, for example, where force
or the threat of force has been used or where the “complainant [i]s asleep
or otherwise unconscious,” 61 and the defendant knows this to be the
case) in which consent and reasonable belief in consent will be
presumed to be absent. The Act makes it clear, however, that such
presumptions can be rebutted by the defendant’s successfully adducing
evidence that justifies raising the complainant’s consent or his
reasonable belief therein as an issue for consideration. 62 Alongside this
list, therefore, the Act also sets out, under section 76, two circumstances
in which the presumption will be conclusive - namely where the
defendant has intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or
56. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(1) (U.K.).
57. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(2) (U.K.).
58. D.P.P. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C.182 at 188.
59. R. v. Olugboja, [1982] Q.B. 320, 332.
60. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 74 (U.K.).
61. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 75 (U.K.). Arguably this represents a reduction in the level
of protection afforded to the complainant, since under the previous position, the fact of
unconsciousness meant that, as a matter of law, the complainant could not consent – see Larter and
Castleton, [1995] Crim. L.R. 75 and Malone, [1998] Crim. L.R. 834.
62. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 75 (U.K.).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/5

20

Munro: Constructing Consent
MUNRO_FINAL

2008]

3/23/2009 3:23 PM

CONSTRUCTING CONSENT

943

purpose of the act or has intentionally induced the complainant to
consent by impersonating someone she knows. 63
A number of commentators have welcomed this framework’s
efforts to provide greater guidance on the issue of sexual consent, and
thereby to improve the consistency and predictability of court decisions
in rape cases. Its elevation of at least some situations of intercourse
under questionable circumstances to a position in which non-consent is
presumed has been welcomed for sending out important social signals
about the boundaries of acceptable sexual behavior. It has been
submitted that this will encourage more rape complainants to report their
experiences to the police and secure an increased number of convictions;
these being core goals driving the reform process. Despite this,
however, these provisions have also come under considerable criticism.
Commentators have, for example, questioned the wisdom of setting up a
hierarchy of rape, of the sort implied in this three-pronged approach. In
addition, concerns have been expressed about the categorization of
circumstances as between sections 75 and 76, 64 and a number of critics
have challenged the decision to make the list of section 75 circumstances
exhaustive, lamenting the omission of other situations of dubious
consent, such as where the complainant is subjected to non-violent
threats or is self-intoxicated. 65
Of course, where these presumptions do not to apply, this simply
reverts the evidential balance between prosecution and defense back to
that which it would have hitherto been. In these situations, the definition
of consent under section 74 resumes its central role, as do the provisions
under section 1(2) in regard to the evaluation of the reasonableness of
belief. While the legislation’s attempt here to bring about a more
communicative understanding of sexuality, grounded in agreement about
intercourse between the parties, rather than on a presumption of male
proposition, has been applauded, it has been argued that these provisions
also present substantial difficulties. In requiring that a person must have

63. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 76 (U.K.).
64. Jennifer Temkin & Andrew Ashworth, supra note 4, at 336-37; Jenny McEwan, Proving
Consent in Sexual Cases: Legislative Change and Cultural Evolution, 9 INT’L J. EVID. & PROOF 1,
20-21 (2005).
65. See generally Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated
Consent and Drug Assisted Rape Revisited, 2004 CRIM. L. REV. 789. For further discussion on
issues surrounding intoxicated sexual consent, see Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Intoxicated
Consent and the Boundaries of Drug-Assisted Rape, 2003 CRIM. L. REV. 773; Karen M. Kramer,
Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related Acquaintance Rapes, 47
STAN. L. REV. 115 (1994); Alan Wertheimer, Intoxicated Consent to Sexual Relations, 20 LAW &
PHIL. 373 (2001); and Nicholas Dixon, Alcohol and Rape, 15 PUB. AFF. Q. 341 (2001).
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the freedom and capacity to make the relevant choice, the definition of
consent under section 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 directs
attention more clearly than in the past to the context in which agreement
to intercourse is given or refused. In turn, this offers the potential for a
less one-dimensional understanding of agency, which acknowledges the
reality that the outcome of the consent binary cannot be radically
divorced from the circumstances under which the choice is made. This
suggests a protection of the value of sexual autonomy which, if
interpreted broadly, could permit a more complex analysis of the power
dynamics and cultural pressures that operate to constrain a person’s
freedom and capacity to make sexual choices. In reality, however, the
extent to which section 74 is capable of producing this result remains
uncertain.
Terms such as freedom, choice and capacity can be interpreted in
radically divergent and often minimalist ways. In the specific context of
the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is clear that these terms are not
intended to imply absolute freedom or choice. As a result, however, “all
the questions about how much liberty of action satisfies the ‘definition’
remain at large.” 66 Responsibility for this interpretation is left first in
the hands of the judiciary and then with jurors who will apply judicial
guidance to the circumstances of each case. 67 In recent case law,
however, the judiciary has been reluctant to propose any substantive
development of these tests in the directions that are given to the jury, 68
and recent research with mock jurors – conducted by the author –
indicates significant variability in the way in which these ideas of
freedom and capacity will be applied. 69 Indeed, without greater
guidance, it seems that the new legislation – though intended to promote

66. Temkin & Ashworth, supra note 64, at 336.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., R. v. Bree, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 256. For an excellent discussion of this
judgment and the issues arising therefrom, see Philip Rumney & Rachel Fenton, Intoxicated
Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making, MOD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with
author).
69. Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Breaking Boundaries: Sexual Consent in the Jury Room,
26 LEGAL STUD. 303, 315-16 (2006) [hereinafter Finch & Munro, Breaking Boundaries]. While
some jurors read the legislation as requiring something “active rather than passive” - as “saying that
consent isn’t just being there and not saying no” - many others adopted a different position,
commenting: “I think maybe that’s why she consented, because she didn’t say anything” or “in
order to not consent you have to . . . she has to actually make it clear that she has not consented.”
Id. at 316. Even in the case of a heavily intoxicated complainant, moreover, a number of the jurors
illustrated the tenacity of the force requirement insisting that they would expect to find evidence of
struggle / injury to establish non-consent. Id. For further discussion of the mock jurors’ discussions
around the issue of intoxication in particular, see Finch & Munro, Demon Drink, supra note 39.
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a more proactive and communicative understanding of sexuality – may
do little to prevent jurors from continuing to presume consent in the
absence of positive dissent. 70
Similar problems emerge, moreover, in regard to the provisions
under the Act relating to the defendant’s belief in consent. The Sexual
Offences Act 2003 shifts the position from one in which an honest,
albeit unreasonable, belief in consent sufficed to absolve the defendant
of liability, to one in which any such belief must be reasonable. While
this represents a (not uncontroversial) departure from ordinary standards
of criminal responsibility, it was accepted that there were peculiar and
legitimate grounds for holding defendants to a higher level of
accountability in the rape context. In particular, it was deemed to be
relevant that the parties would be in close proximity, such that the
defendant’s responsibility to ensure consent could be easily discharged,
and that intercourse in its absence would constitute both a violation of
the victim’s bodily integrity and a disregard for her sexual autonomy.
But even if imposing a reasonable belief threshold can be justified on
these grounds (and I believe that it can), it is less than clear that it will
operate in practice to hold defendants to a higher level of accountability.
There is, after all, considerable evidence of tenacious and popular,
but fundamentally questionable, views about ‘appropriate’ sexual
behavior in our society. Of course, the fact that many people believe
that women who say no do not always mean it, or that men are entitled
to use proactive strategies to secure intercourse, 71 does not speak to the
reasonableness of those beliefs as such, but it does suggest that these
views are more likely to be deemed reasonable when assessed by a jury
of peers in the rape trial. Certainly, in the mock study mentioned above,
it was clear that jurors often deduced sexual consent (or at least the
defendant’s reasonable belief therein) from other, unrelated, events that
70. Id. See also Emily Finch & Vanessa Munro, Of Bodies, Boundaries and Borders:
Intoxicated Sexual Consent Under the Law of Scotland and England, JURIDICAL REV. 53 (2005);
Finch & Munro, Juror Stereotypes, supra note 39.
71. E. Sandra Byers & Paula Wilson, Accuracy of Women’s Expectations Regarding Men’s
Responses to Refusals of Sexual Advances in Dating Situations, 8 INT’L J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. 376,
385 (1985). In the Byers and Wilson study, fewer than 40% of male and female respondents
interpreted a woman’s direct, unqualified refusal to mean that she wanted a man to immediately
stop his advances. Id. at 384. This skepticism may be attributed to belief in ‘scripted refusals’ by
women who wish to engage in sex, but who wish to avoid the appearance of sexual promiscuity.
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Marcia L. McCoy, Double Standard / Double Bind: The Sexual Double
Standard and Women’s Communication About Sex, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 447, 448-49 (1991);
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When They Mean
Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 874 (1988).
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lacked temporal correspondence with the intercourse. The introduction
of these wider circumstantial factors allowed jurors to rely on a range of
(ill-founded) views about ‘appropriate’ socio-sexual interaction. Thus,
for example, several jurors argued that it would be reasonable for the
defendant to believe that the complainant was consenting to intercourse
if she “had been drinking all night and flirting with him.” 72 The
likelihood that such patterns will emerge in ‘real’ jury deliberations is
strengthened, moreover, by section 1(2) of the Sexual Offences Act
2003, which, rather than relying on a ‘reasonable person’ standard,
adopts a general test of what is reasonable in all the circumstances. 73
Critics have argued that, if interpreted broadly, this test not only permits,
but invites, jurors “to scrutinise the complainant’s behaviour to
determine whether there was anything about it which could have induced
a reasonable belief in consent.” 74
At the same time, moreover, this phrasing of the mens rea test also
permits scope for the personal characteristics of the defendant to play a
role in assessing reasonableness. Introduced to permit flexibility in the
case of defendants who exhibit individual characteristics (youth, low IQ,
etc.) that make an unmodified objective standard unduly harsh, section
1(2) refuses to specify which circumstances and characteristics are
relevant, and in Parliamentary debates preceding the legislation, it was
suggested that the judge and jury would determine this in every case. 75
But, as Catharine MacKinnon has insisted, “[t]o attempt to solve [the
problem of rape] by adopting reasonable belief as a standard without
asking, on a substantive social basis, to whom the belief is reasonable
and why – meaning, what conditions make it reasonable – is one-sided:
male-sided.” 76 In the context of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, Sharon
Cowan has developed this position, cautioning that this legislative
flexibility in favor of the defendant may be secured at the cost of
rendering it reasonable for an accused who has “led an especially
sheltered life, in a rural place, within a sexist family, has not been
schooled in the shifting gender power relations of the twenty-first
century” to believe, for example, that a woman is consenting to
intercourse despite her verbal protestations. 77
In the final analysis, then, it seems that while the Sexual Offences
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Finch & Munro, Breaking Boundaries, supra note 69
Sexual Offences Act, 2003, § 1(2) (U.K.).
Temkin & Ashworth, supra note 64, at 341-42.
Lord Falconer, 648 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 1074-75.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 15, at 183.
Cowan, supra note 4, at 62.
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Act 2003 could be interpreted and applied by the courts in a truly
progressive way that would redress many of the substantial concerns that
have been raised above in regard to consent in general, and sexual
consent in particular, it is far from clear that it will operate in this way in
practice. To some extent, of course, this conclusion raises inevitable
questions about the relationship between legal reform and social change,
and more specifically about whether the promotion of a genuinely
context-sensitive and deconstructed understanding of sexual consent can
– or indeed should – be something that we look to the criminal law to
achieve. These questions will be reflected upon further in the following
section, which also develops an argument in favor of a ‘consent-plus’
model that acknowledges the influence of external pressures on personal
self-determination and – without necessarily seeking their elimination –
subjects these forces to critical scrutiny, in the hope of moving beyond
false consciousness or ‘submit to survive’ acquiescence and towards a
self-reflective and experientially correspondent sense of (sexual)
autonomy.
IV. DECONSTRUCTING CHOICE: FREEDOM, CAPACITY &
REASONABLENESS IN THE SEXUAL CONTEXT
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides a useful illustration of the
extent to which legal standards that at first sight appear to be exacting
will often fail to translate into demanding thresholds when removed
from the lofty isolation of abstract theorizing and transposed into the
messy realities of everyday socio-sexual life. As discussed above, the
notion that women meaningfully consent to sex only where they exercise
a choice to do so, in conditions in which they enjoy both freedom and
capacity, indicates a rigorous threshold that has the potential to render
non-consensual many mundane instances in which women engage in
intercourse with male partners / spouses purely out of a sense of
relational obligation, to strengthen their relative bargaining position, or
in pursuit of improved social status. In practice, however, the legislation
is likely to be interpreted in a significantly more reductive way, with the
existence of freedom and capacity being evidenced by the absence of
obvious counter-veiling coercion, deception, or stupefaction.
No doubt, there are many who would defend precisely such an
approach – insisting that anything other than this ‘consensual
minimalism’ would be both unjust and unjustifiable, expanding the reach
of the state into our private and sexual lives in hitherto unprecedented
ways and imposing upon male suitors an arduous burden to discharge
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their potential criminal responsibility for non-consensual intercourse by
undertaking an investigation, not only of the averred articulations of
their partners, but also of their inner desires, motivations, and psyche, as
well as of their levels of social and economic power. 78 While (at least
some of) these concerns may be legitimate, it will be argued in this
section that this kind of totalizing ‘all-or-nothing’ perspective is
disappointing. There is a real danger that, without some more proactive
development, this new piece of legislation will simply re-trace the steps
of its predecessor. Focusing attention only on the most obvious
impediments to agency, it risks undermining the more progressive
intentions of (some of) its drafters by failing to offer any more
sophisticated analysis of the boundaries of permissibility in the myriad
sexual scenarios in which, despite the absence of such impediments, it is
clear that full and free choice is nonetheless lacking.
Theorists who, in the past, have sought to challenge this kind of
minimalist approach have often done so by adopting a ‘consent-plus’
model, according to which something more than a mere token of
acquiescence (or even affirmation), in the absence of coercion or
deception, is required in order to render sexual contact (legally /
morally) permissible. Theorists like Eva Kittay, 79 Lois Pineau, 80
Elizabeth Anderson, 81 and Martha Chamallas 82 have, in their different
ways, all insisted that reciprocal sexual desire, experiences of sexual
pleasure, or mutual sexual attraction and affirmation of an emotionally
intimate relationship must also accompany a token of sexual consent in
order to render it an expression of genuine agency; and have disputed the
validity of ‘consensual’ sex embarked upon for any other (instrumental)
reason. These theorists are to be commended for their efforts both to

78. The threshold of ‘consensual minimalism’ has recently been defended by Alan
Wertheimer. ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 130 (2003). He defines it as
entailing that “a sexual relationship is permissible if it is consensual in some reasonably
straightforward sense. . . .” Id. Thus, while any circumstances of force, coercion or deception stand
to be evaluated in terms of their effect on the validity of consent, in the absence of these conditions,
a prima facie token of consent will be sufficient in itself to render sexual contact permissible. Id. at
140. For an examination of the merits and demerits of Wertheimer’s analysis of sexual consent, see
Vanessa Munro, Concerning Consent: Standards of Permissibility in Sexual Relations, 25 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 335 (2005).
79. Eva Fede Kittay, Ah! My Foolish Heart: A Reply to Alan Soble’s “Antioch’s ‘Sexual
Offence Policy’: A Philosophical Exploration”, 28 J. SOC. PHIL. 153 (1997).
80. Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY,
AND THE LAW 1 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996).
81. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
82. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 777 (1988).
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interrogate behind the veil of affirmative tokening in the (hetero)sexual
context and to render the transformative power of consent contingent
upon a higher standard of subjective engagement and wantedness. Their
insistence upon the importance of mutuality in sexual contact is
valuable, especially in a context in which there is considerable evidence
that women do engage in ‘consensual but unwanted’ sexual relations
with men. 83 At the same time, however, these approaches have been
criticized for arbitrarily privileging some reasons for engaging in
intercourse over equally viable alternatives, with little clear justification.
While this presents a powerful model, it risks excessive protectionism,
as well as a problematic refusal to engage with the narratives of many
women who consciously participate in sexual intercourse in exchange
for other benefits, without any resultant sense of self-alienation,
exploitation, or violation.
In light of this critique, a more promising way of moving beyond
‘consensual minimalism’ may be found in the claim that genuine agency
is expressed, not simply when individuals are in a position to articulate
and implement their desires, but when they have hitherto ‘taken charge’
of those desires in a particular way. 84 At the heart of this approach is a
privileging of people’s ‘programmatic’ choices about how they really
want to live their lives over their more impulsive and intuitive ‘episodic’
Under this approach, before she can exercise a
preferences. 85
meaningful and transformative choice, the female agent must have
adopted a seriously self-engaged and evaluative approach to the sexual
act in question. This does not mean that she can only become involved
in serious sexual relationships, but it does mean that the decision to
engage in more frivolous exchanges must be the outcome of serious
reflection and endorsement. Without jettisoning the importance of
mutuality or underestimating the impact of disciplinary norms and
disparities of power / resources, this approach shifts, then, from the
substantive consent-plus model of Kittay et al. towards a more
83. A survey conducted in the United States, for example, revealed that while 91% of female
respondents indicated that their first experience of intercourse was consensual, one quarter of them
nonetheless rated its level of wantedness as low (4 out of 10 or below). See JODY RAPHAEL,
SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE AND POVERTY 49 (2000). For further discussion
of this survey, see Joyce Abma, Anne Driscoll & Kristin Moore, Young Women’s Degree of Control
over their First Intercourse: An Exploratory Analysis, 30 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 14 (1998).
84. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY ESSAY ON BENTHAM 189
(Mary Warnock ed., 1962). For further discussion on this, see ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND
TRUST IN BIOETHICS 31 (2004).
85. For further discussion of this distinction between episodic and programmatic choice, and
its implications on the operation of autonomy, see DIANA T. MEYERS, SELF, SOCIETY, AND
PERSONAL CHOICE (1989); FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF (Diana T. Meyers ed., 1997).
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procedural insistence on critical reflection about the reasons that
underpin, constrain, construct, and motivate our choices. According to
Stephen Schulhofer, this model demands that agents engage in
“conscious reflection about preferences and a deliberate choice of one’s
goals.” 86 It is not enough to ensure that a person’s preferences are not
“deformed by false beliefs, artificially constraining cultural pressures, or
the need to minimize psychic stress.” 87 Indeed, active steps must also be
taken – if necessary by the state – to ensure what Joseph Raz has called
‘autonomy’ competence. 88 Thus, this approach goes beyond the
minimalist baseline, not only insisting that there be an absence of
immediate obstacles to valid consent (e.g. coercion or deception), but
also that adequate education be provided to enable people to manage
their long-term self-determination, that a range of genuine and realistic
alternatives be made available for people to choose from, and that a
culture be promoted which actively encourages introspection about one’s
personal desires. 89
As Alan Wertheimer has argued, it may be reasonable to assume,
prima facie, that a person who tokens consent to sexual relations always
does so expecting some kind of reciprocal benefit. 90 What the consentplus model emphasizes, however, is that it is not enough to simply take
this expectation, or the motivations that underpin it, at face value. While
there is flexibility here as to its substantive content, the extent to which
the consenting party genuinely endorses and values this benefit (in the
overall context of her unique life narrative, personal relationships, and
subjective desires) remains central. And this is important since, as
discussed above, the construction and constraint imposed on women’s
(sexual) agency – by a complex network of socio-economic inequality,
cultural expectations and relational obligations that encourage
submissive femininity and controlled (but available) sexual access –
make it likely that there will be many situations in which a woman will
engage in sexual exchanges in pursuit of a benefit that, on closer
inspection, she does not endorse. 91 Imagine, for example, a woman who

86. SCHULHOFER, supra note 46, at 106
87. Id.
88. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 203-06 (1986).
89. SCHULHOFER, supra note 46, at 106.
90. WERTHEIMER, supra note 78, at 140.
91. Abrams, supra note 45, at 764-65. Debate over the legitimacy, and possibility, of consent
emerges in a range of contexts involving women’s sexuality – these are particularly prominent, for
example, in debates around prostitution policy and sex trafficking, but also feature in discussions
about pornography, marriage, compulsory heterosexuality, and compulsory motherhood, etc. For
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has sex with her male partner, not so much because she wants to, but
because she knows that he wants her to. In the absence of overt coercion
or deception, this would be condoned and normalized as an
unproblematic instance of consensual sex under a minimalist approach.
But under this more ambitious consent-plus model, that conclusion
would have to be postponed pending an investigation of the context of,
and motivations underpinning, the intercourse. If the woman complied
because she loves her partner, values their relationship and knows that
responding to his sexual advances is important to its health, this may be
a legitimate expression of agency, reflecting her endorsement of the
benefits that accrue to her as a result of the exchange. By contrast, if she
complied because she fears she cannot survive financially without him
or is afraid of his (as yet unthreatened) retribution in the event of
rebuttal, her involvement emerges as self-alienating, undertaken in
pursuit of an unendorsed benefit, and thus problematic. This approach
continues, therefore, to track the expectation of reciprocal benefit but,
unlike more minimalist analyses of sexual agency, it interrogates the
context of decision-making to ensure actual rather than assumed
subjective value. Amongst other things, this has the benefit of paying
close attention to the diverse ways in which both institutionalized
structures of power / knowledge and localized familial / communal
imperatives influence an individual’s desires. In so doing, it also
confronts the willful blindness of the dominant rhetoric around agency,
self-determination, and consent, and – crucially – serves to reconnect an
abstract sexual choice with the concrete context in which that choice is
framed, selected, and then acted upon. 92
Perhaps most significantly, this model creates a forum in which
agency can be encouraged, fostered, and exercised without resort to a
utopian vision of self-determination in which constraint and construction
are transcended, avoided, or eliminated. Centering on the endorsement
of some anticipated reciprocal benefit as the necessary companion to any
apparently valid token of consent, this approach does not demand that
people be elevated from the practical and theoretical limitations that
impinge upon their decision-making. Instead, it is enough that the
parties, exercising choice within the social constraints incumbent upon
them, have critically evaluated, and then integrated the values reflected
further development of the ways in which exchanges operate in sexual relations, see LINDA R.
HIRSHMAN & JANE E. LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF SEX (1998).
92. For recent re-engagements with female agency, see, for example, LOIS MCNAY, GENDER
AND AGENCY: RECONFIGURING THE SUBJECT IN FEMINIST AND SOCIAL THEORY (2000); and DIANA
T. MEYERS, GENDER IN THE MIRROR: CULTURAL IMAGERY AND WOMEN’S AGENCY (2002).
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in the choices that they make. Thus, while other approaches might
dictate that the prostitute who tokens consent to sex in exchange for
money can never be exercising genuine agency, this approach asserts
that – in the absence of the control of pimps or the compulsion of drugaddiction, etc. – this may constitute a meaningful choice, so long as she
has previously both reflected upon and reconciled (as at least some sex
workers appear to do) her selling of sex as a coherent and endorsed
aspect of her life narrative. Of course, this in no way entails that we
should divert attention away from interrogating the broader socioeconomic constraints that impact upon this woman in her reflective
process, challenging them where necessary in pursuit of a more just
distribution of resources and expectations. But it does ensure that the
focus is on those instances in which the parties experience the pain of
self-alienation and a lack of ‘wantedness’ through their sexual
participation. As a result, it allows critical engagement with the
discursive and relational circumstances that define the confines of a
person’s sexual decision-making, without submerging that person’s
ability to speak within the structural dictates of these circumstances –
and it makes it clear that, as Brenda Baker has argued, “[i]t is not
reasonable to expect consent to do all the work needed for sexual
equality. . . .” 93
A. Legislating for Critical Reciprocity - Promoting Justice or Just
Convictions?
Nicola Lacey has suggested that “[w]hile the idea of autonomy as
independence seems directly relevant to the wrong of rape, it dominates
at the expense of the development of a positive conception of what kinds
of sexual relationships matter to personhood.” 94 Building on that
insight, discussion in this section has sought to develop an approach that
would better attend to this deeper understanding of personhood. Where
the conventional model of agency has tended to ignore background
factors of social constructionism, and more radical critique has
paternalistically overruled their effects, this approach respects the
agent’s felt convictions whilst insisting that the benefits perceived to
accrue in any sexual exchange are always subjected to critical analysis.
As a result, it demands a serious engagement with the question of
whether the intercourse in question was not only not resisted and not
93. Brenda Baker, Understanding Consent in Sexual Assault, in A MOST DETESTABLE CRIME:
NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON RAPE 49, 64 (Keith Burgess-Jackson ed., 1999).
94. UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS, supra note 14, at 117.
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undertaken as a result of coercion / deception, but was also welcome,
wanted and non-alienating when judged from the experiential point of
view of the parties.
While this model provides a standard of sexual intimacy that, it is
submitted, we should aspire to privilege in the myriad social sites in
which disciplinary discourses are constituted and circulated, there can be
little doubt that transposing it into a fair and efficient legal framework is
no easy task. For one thing, the process of tracing the integration of
values within a person’s life-plan may be too complicated for an
instrument as notoriously blunt as the law to accommodate well. Not
only are there concerns about how we would go about locating the
evidence with which to make assessments on the legitimacy of a
person’s preferences, but there are also problems with the state’s ability
to make determinations on such issues from its necessarily detached
perspective. In addition, there are public policy reasons to avoid
allowing the law to over-reach into areas of personal living, and it would
be a substantial departure from practice in other areas if we were
required to interrogate prima facie valid tokens of sexual consent in
order to assess their integration within a person’s overall life-plan. Of
course, the fact that state intervention is generally treated with suspicion
does not entail that it is always unjustifiable, and it may be that in this
context there are compelling reasons – grounded in the value of
autonomy and the need to prevent other-imposed harm – that permit this
kind of investigation wherever the less coercive mechanisms engaged at
other disciplinary sites have failed to impact adequately upon sexual
negotiation practices. 95
Perhaps more significantly, though, the adoption of this approach in
law would also give rise to some very difficult questions from the
defendant’s point of view. Even assuming that the law is capable of
engaging with contextual and psychic nuances sufficiently to recognize
and accredit those situations in which a women’s token of consent to
intercourse is not in fact supported by a critical endorsement of the
benefits associated with the exchange, it may be unduly demanding to
hold a defendant criminally liable for rape as a result of his failure to do
the same. Indeed, in a context in which the defendant may have already
taken reasonable steps to secure the woman’s token of consent, to insist
that he must also ensure that this token is not tainted with self-alienation

95. For further discussion on the nature of these negotiation strategies – and a defense of their
legitimacy – see, in particular, Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401
(2005).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2008

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 5
MUNRO_FINAL

954

3/23/2009 3:23 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[41:923

(generated, perhaps, by subtle social or psychic dynamics out with his
control) may seem excessively burdensome – and some would add,
highly unromantic. This may be particularly so in the case of a
defendant who has had no (or a limited) prior relationship with the
complainant, and who, as a result, would be wholly ill-placed to assess
whether her tokened affirmation (or even initiation) of sexual intercourse
really means yes. 96
Bearing in mind these difficulties, the upshot of transposing this
model into law may be one in which feminist victories won at the actus
reus stage in rape trials will be un-done by assessments of mens rea that
refuse to see the defendant’s belief in consent as unreasonable. For
those who pursue rape law reform purely in order to secure greater
convictions, this may emerge, in the final analysis, as somewhat
disappointing. But at the same time, as was acknowledged in the
drafting of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the role of law in society
extends beyond the confines of the criminal courtroom. Indeed, this reengagement with the consent threshold affords an opportunity for the
law to lead by example, holding out a model of sexual relations that
takes both mutuality and reciprocity seriously, and thereby generating
attitudinal changes that may, in time, permit holding defendants to a
higher level of accountability in regard to their sexual communication
strategies. In addition, the extent to which this approach puts the
experiential perspective of the complainant centre stage, at least in its
evaluation of the actus reus component of the offence, is itself
symbolically important, since this perspective has too often been
neglected, distorted or rejected in the rape context by both legal and
feminist analyses.
Notably, as discussed above, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is
already drafted in terms that would permit it to move in this kind of
critical reciprocity consent-plus direction. It is true, in fact, that a fully
expansive interpretation, in which the concepts of freedom and capacity
would retain the hue of transcendence and self-willed action associated
with their Enlightenment origins, would actually pose the threat of being
over-inclusive. Perhaps it is the specter of this that lies behind the
judicial reluctance, evidenced in case decisions to date, to flesh out the
contours of the new legislative tests on consent in a way that would
require jurors to abandon their typically minimalist interpretive baseline.
96. I am grateful to Sharon Cowan for pointing out that there is, of course, a counter to this,
which would insist that these are precisely the situations in which men should be held to a higher
standard, since they have no background context of a relationship against which to judge the quality
of the token of consent.
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Whatever the reason, it is submitted that – to fulfill its progressive
potential – the legislation, and any subsequent law reform that builds
upon it, must embrace rather than abandon the (messy) middle ground
between minimalism and utopianism staked out here. Whether this
requires more legislative intervention, expanded judicial instructions,
targeted (myth-dispelling) education for jurors, or a combination of all
three, remains to be seen, but it is telling – and appropriate – that policymakers in England and Wales should be considering these strategies so
soon after the passing of the Act. 97
V. CONCLUSION
Women (and many men) are enmeshed in institutionalized
structures of power-knowledge that often thwart “their efforts to achieve
[ ] cognitive and moral autonomy,” such that they “too often live as selffulfilling prophecies” conforming to normative roles that have been
scripted for them rather than developing extensive and expansive
avenues for effective agency. 98 In a context in which the terrain of
social, political, and economic power is far from gender equal and a
woman’s sexuality can be deployed to secure greater benefits, it is
perhaps unsurprising that many women engage in sex that is not
genuinely experienced by them as ‘wanted.’ There are certainly strong
reasons to continue to criticize and challenge these differential
distributions of social benefit, but – as noted in regard to Catharine
MacKinnon’s work – there is little to be gained by blanket refusal to
accredit any tokens of (sexual) consent issued by women under current
conditions. In any social context, a person’s preferences are never
entirely self-generated, and to attribute an individual woman’s
experiences of autonomy to false consciousness or patriarchal complicity
may be to misrepresent her own position as well as to overstate the
parameters of agency that are achievable for women (or men) in a postpatriarchal world.
Of course, it is important not to conflate a token of consent with an
expression of wantedness, but problematising the gulf between these two
triggers for intimacy does not require the rejection of the consent
97. Proposals to provide clearer definition on the meaning of capacity for the purposes of
section 74 and to introduce general expert evidence to educate jurors about the realities of rape were
put forward for public consultation in 2006. The Government’s response to this consultation
exercise has yet to be finalized, but it is notable that the proposals have been rejected by the
judiciary and others as being unnecessary. Home Office, Convicting Rapists, supra note 4.
98. Lorraine Code, The Unicorn in the Garden, in WOMEN AND REASON 263, 265 (Elizabeth
D. Harvey & Kathleen Okruhlik eds., 1992).
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threshold so much as the rejection of any minimalist interpretation
thereof. Adopting the more demanding consent-plus model offered here
cannot, and does not, purport to resolve all the dilemmas that will arise
when we examine the legitimacy of tokens of consent uttered in
everyday socio-sexual life. It does, however, ensure that we begin to ask
the right questions – questions that pay attention to the narratives
presented by those who claim agency without taking their affirmations at
face value, and that avoid the double-bind between ignoring and
resigning ourselves to constraints on free choice. What is required is not
only a token of affirmation but also a sensation – not so much of control
over the social structures that shape our lives (which may be illusory) –
but of critical endorsement of the way in which the dictates of those
structures are integrated and incorporated into personal narratives. 99
While the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in England and Wales offers the
potential for this kind of approach, it is unlikely to produce it,
particularly in a context in which the judiciary are stubbornly resistant to
claims that concepts of ‘freedom’ or ‘capacity’ require explanation, in
which liberal ideals of abstract subjectivity and unfettered autonomy fail
to capture reality, and in which jurors (immersed, by contrast, in that
reality) cling to minimalist interpretations.

99. JANA SAWICKI, DISCIPLINING FOUCAULT – FEMINISM, POWER, AND THE BODY 37 (1991)
(quoting Karen Rian, Sadomasochism and the Social Construction of Desire, in ROBIN RUTH
LINDEN ET AL., AGAINST SADOMASOCHISM: A RADICAL FEMINIST ANALYSIS 49 (1982)).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/5

34

